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STATE ACTION AND LIBERAL THEORY:
A CASENOTE ON Flagg Brothers v. Brooks
PAUL BREST

t

I. INTRODUCTION

Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks I invites commentary in a symposium on the public/private
distinction. The case arose out of a dispute between a moving and
storage company and the owners of personal belongings stored in its
warehouse. When storage charges alleged to be due the company
remained unpaid, Flagg Brothers sought to enforce its statutory
warehouseman's lien by selling the goods. The owners challenged
the proposed sale on the ground that disposition of their goods
without a prior administrative or judicial hearing would deprive
them of their property without due process of law. The Supreme
Court dismissed this claim, holding that the sale constituted private,
not state, action and therefore was not within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment.
In Flagg Brothers, Justice Rehnquist simultaneously asserts
the "'essential dichotomy' between public and private acts" 2 and a
concept of legal rights-what I shall call "constitutional positivism'"
-that threatens to collapse the dichotomy. Justice Rehnquist is
the Court's most forceful proponent of constitutional positivism, aview held as an article of faith by many contemporary judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars. The tension between constitutional
positivism and the public/private distinction is, therefore, not only
Justice Rehnquist's problem, but one for American legal theory
in general.
Let me elaborate on what I mean by "constitutional positivism"
and situate it in the context of liberal political theory. From its
inception, liberal theory has had two traditions, originating in the
writings of Locke and Hobbes respectively. Under the Lockean or
"natural rights" version, citizens retain certain inalienable rights,
held in the pregovernmental state of nature, that the state may not
f Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1962, Swarthmore College; LL.B.
1965, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar. This essay has benefited
greatly from comments by Iris Brest, Tom Jackson, Mark Kelman, Karl Kare, and
Ira Nerkin.
'436 U.S. 149 (1978).
2 Id. 165 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349
(1974)).
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abridge. Under the Hobbesian or "positivist" version, citizens
entering into civil society relinquish all natural rights and possess
only those rights granted by legislatures and other lawmaking institutions. As the writings of H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, and Ronald
Dworkin illustrate,8 both of these traditions remain vital in modern
liberal theory.
The tension between positivism and natural law has been a
perennial theme in American constitutional jurisprudence. I refer
here not to Hart's ultimate constitutional questions about the metarules or practices that determine what decisions by what institutions
can be characterized as "law," but to more substantive questions
concerning the theories and sources that decisionmakers-especially
courts and most especially the United States Supreme Court-should
use to resolve constitutional disputes. The debate has centered on
the extent to which the Justices may protect interests or rights beyond those explicitly mentioned in the document. Since the Civil
War, this controversy has focused on whether the contents of
"liberty" and "property" in the due process clauses should ultimately be determined by legislative policy or by transcendent
principles.
The opposing views of Justices Peckham and Holmes in
Lochner v. New York 4 can be understood as the opposition of the
natural law and positivist branches of liberalism. Justice Peckham's opinion for the Court, striking down a law limiting -the
working hours of bakers, was premised on the natural liberty of
employers and employees to contract for the purchase and sale of
labor without government interference. Justice Holmes, dissenting,
referred disparagingly to liberty of contract as a "shibboleth [of]
some well-known writers" and asserted that the Constitution was
not intended to embody a particular theory of "the organic relation
of the citizen to the State." 8 For Holmes, the definition of rights
was a matter of legislative policy, not of judicially discovered transcendent principles.
In its extreme form, constitutional positivism regards all property interests as creatures of the state and accords the state plenary
discretion to define the circumstances by which, and the procedures
through which, such interests are acquired, held, and lost. Justice
3

See R. DwonacN, TA=NG
RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); H. HART, Tim CoN(1961); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 H.xv. L. REV. 630 (1958).
CEPT OF LAw

4 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
51d. 75.
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Rehnquist described the conceptual foundations of this position in
Flagg Brothers:
[A] property interest is not a monolithic, abstract concept
hovering in the legal stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights
in personalty, the metes and bounds of which are determined by the decisional and statutory law of the State of
New York. The validity of the property interest in these
possessions which respondents previously acquired from
some other private person depends on New York law, and
the manner in which that same property interest in these
same possessions may be lost or transferred to still another
private person likewise depends on New York law.6
If this is true of traditional forms of private property, it holds
a fortiori for statutory entitlements. Under a constitutional positivist view, the "metes and bounds" of procedural due process in
the granting and withholding of a statutory entitlement are determined solely by the legislation creating the entitlement. For example, in Arnett v. Kennedy 7 Justice Rehnquist wrote that the
legislature's power to create a particular government job included
discretion to determine the conditions under which employment
could be held or terminated. In rejecting a federal employee's constitutional challenge to the procedures by which he was dismissed
for cause, Rehnquist found it conclusive that the procedures were
part of the same statutory scheme that created the employment:
The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a
guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress
has designated for the determination of cause....
• . . [W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures
which are to be employed in determining that right, a
litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter
with the sweet.8
6436 U.S. at 160 n.10.

Property Talk."

Compare Bruce Ackerman's description of "Scientific
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(1977).
7416 U.S. 134 (1974).
8 Id. 152, 153-54. Justice Stevens seemed to adopt this view in his opinion for
the Court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In rejecting a police officer's
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By contrast, other judges and commentators, less committed to constitutional positivism, have urged that the due process clause protects values such as individual dignity and participation even
against infringement by explicit legislative action. 9
The natural law and positivist branches of liberalism also have
different implications for the perennial problem of state action.
Under a regime of natural law, the state's enforcement of fundamental property and contractual interests is not the product of state
policy or action, but the recognition of preexisting, natural rights
of property and contractual liberty. For Justice Pecklham, a New
York court's enforcement of the contract between Lochner and his
employees would not have been state action.'
On the other hand,
Peckham likely would have viewed a state court's refusal to uphold
the contract-even if New York had not fined Lochner for entering
into it-as state action of the most egregious sort, depriving both
parties of their natural liberty to contract, and their right to property as well."
claim that the due process clause guaranteed him a right to a hearing before being
discharged for cause, he wrote:
A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by
ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state
law....
... [T]he ordinance may ... be construed as granting no right to
continued employment but merely conditioning an employee's removal on
compliance with certain specified procedures ...
In this case, as the District Court construed the ordinance, the City
Manager's determination of the adequacy of the grounds for discharge is
not subject to judicial review; the employee is merely given certain procedural rights which the District Court found not to have been violated
in this case....
Under that view of the law, petitioner's discharge did not deprive
him of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. 344-45, 347 (footnotes omitted). But see Flagg Bros., 416 U.S. at 169-70 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting):
It could be argued that since the State has the power to create property
interests, it should also have the power to determine what procedures
should attend the deprivation of those interests. See Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (Rehnquist J., [plurality opinion]) . . . . [A]
majority of this Court has never adopted that position ....
9 See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885 (1981); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cr L. REv. 28 (1976); Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights,
1973 DuxE L.J. 1153.
10 Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA~v.
L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1959) (criticizing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
"Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 84-85).
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The connection. between natural rights and state action is not
one of logical necessity. Nonetheless, the doctrines are mutually
sympathetic: the natural rights doctrine posits a sphere of autonomous private conduct immune from state regulation; the state
action doctrine protects that sphere from certain kinds of governmental interference.
It is no coincidence that state action was born during the
12
ascendency of a constitutional jurisprudence of natural rights.

The state action doctrine originated in the Civil Rights Cases,13 in
which the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment did
not authorize Congress to prohibit discrimination by privately
owned inns, conveyances, and places of amusement; rather, its purpose was to "provide modes of redress against the operation of State
laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when
these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment." 14 Justice Bradley, a strong advocate of the constitutional enforcement of natural rights, 3 assumed for the purpose of
the opinion that citizens have a natural right, recognized by the
common law, to equal access to public facilities, and that a state
would violate the fourteenth amendment by failing to protect that
right. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not "corrective
legislation":
It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional
wrong committed by the States ....

It applies equally to

cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities
are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise
in States that may have violated the prohibition of the
amendment. 6
The Court held that Congress's power under the fourteenth amendment was limited to remedying state derelictions, and that the
statute was constitutionally defective because it applied without
12 See Nerkin, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil fights Cases and State Action
Theory, 12 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297 (1977).

13 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14 Id. 11.

15 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1873)
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
16 109 U.S. at 13, 14.
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regard to whether a particular state protected its citizens' natural
17
rights.
Subsequent to that decision, more positivist-oriented Courts
have rejected Justice Bradley's view of natural liberties. For the
positivist, the common law does not reflect a constitutionally acknowledged natural order. Whatever constraints the state judiciary
or legislature imposes, or fails to impose, on discrimination by privately owned public accommodations are simply the result of government policy; they are not dictated by natural law. Indeed, for
the positivist, rights of liberty and property exist only by virtue of
the state's protection of them.
The doctrine of state action is an attempt to maintain a public/
private distinction by attributing some conduct to the state and
some to private actors. The doctrine seems, at least, less secure
under constitutional positivism than under a natural law regime.
The positivist cannot invoke the inherently private realm entailed
by .the very concept of natural rights. More fundamentally, since
any private action acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive
its power from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization
at will, positivism potentially implicates the state in every "private"
action not prohibited by law.
In Flagg Brothers, Justice Rehnquist recognizes this danger
and disavows the broadest implications of his constitutional positivism. Immediately following the positivist description of property
rights quoted above, he writes:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of
our previous cases, the notion of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of
a body of property law in a State, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though
no state process or state officials were ever involved in en8
forcing that body of law.'
17 Although this implies that Congress could protect blacks' access to public
facilities where a state systematically failed to do so, Justice Bradley hedged:
We have discussed the question presented by the law on the
assumption that a right to enjoy equal accommodation and privileges in
all inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, is one of
the essential rights of the citizen which no state can abridge or interfere
with. Whether it is such a right, or not, is a different question which
.. . it is not necessary to examine.
109 U.S. at 19.
18 436 U.S. at 160 n.10.
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Indeed, the decision in Flagg Brothers rests on the premise of an
"'essential dichotomy' . . . between public and private acts." 19

The thesis of this essay is that positivists-which means most of
us most of the time-cannot so readily have it both ways: To appropriate Justice Rehnquist's phrase in Arnett v. Kennedy, we
"must take the bitter with the sweet." 20 The recognition that all
social relationships and transactions are governed by law does not
itself collapse the public/private distinction-so long as one maintains a substantive, normative theory of rights. But Rehnquist's
positivism rejects such a theory and in so doing renders the distinction at best meaningless and at worst a vehicle for manipulating
outcomes to suit the Justices' distributive tastes.
Many aspects of my analysis parallel the writings of scholars,
including Lawrence Alexander, Charles Black, Harold Horowitz,
Ira Nerken, Laurence Tribe, and William Van Alstyne, who in
various ways have cast doubts on the "essential dichotomy." 21 If
yet another contribution to this literature can be justified it is because of the perspective provided by Justice Rehnquist's tenacious
adherence to both the state action doctrine and an extreme form
of constitutional positivism. The state action problem vividly illustrates the ambivalent, if not contradictory, relationship of citizen
and state that plagues modern liberal theory.
II.

CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
IN STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

A. From Sniadach to Flagg Brothers: State Help and Self-Help
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.2 the Court struck down
a Wisconsin statute under which, when a creditor filed the appropriate papers, the clerk of court issued a garnishment order to an
allegedly defaulting debtor's employer. The clerk's task was purely
ministerial, and the order issued without notice to the debtor. The
Supreme Court held that prejudgment garnishment without notice
19Id. 165 (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.)).

20 416 U.S. at 154.
21 See L. TRmE, AMERPCAN CoNsTrrUtIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978); Alexander,
Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTNGS
CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975); Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and Californids
Proposition14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S.CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957);
Nerkin, supra note 12; Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and
the Talisman of State Action, 1965 Duxz L.J. 219.
22 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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and a prior hearing deprived the debtor of her property without
due process. Sniadach involved a contract between a finance corn-.
pany and a consumer. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc. 23 the Court extended the Sniadach holding to prohibit
the prejudgment garnishment of a commercial debtor's bank account under similar circumstances. Fuentes v. Shevin 24 relied on
Sniadach to invalidate state statutes that authorized the sheriff to
seize household goods sold under conditional sales contracts on the
basis of a writ issued by the clerk of court upon the seller-creditor's
ex parte application.
The only contested issue in these cases was whether the due
process clause required a hearing before the debtor's property was
garnished or seized.2 Both the majority and the dissenting Justices
assumed, without discussion, the existence of state action-that is,
they assumed that the challenged procedures or transactions were
constrained by the requirements of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In the years following Sniadach, other creditors' remedies were
challenged on due process grounds. These included various "selfhelp" remedies, whereby creditors having security interests in goods
repossessed the goods from defaulting debtors simply by taking
them-without even the ministerial intervention of a state official.
Such self-help repossession by secured creditors has long been permitted in many jurisdictions, and the practice is codified by section
9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code: "Unless otherwise agreed
a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace
... ." 26
Most courts dismissed the constitutional challenges to
section 9-503 on the ground that, in the absence of any participation
by a state official, self-help repossession was private, not state, action,
and therefore not within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.27
23419
24407
25

In Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 28 the Supreme Court adU.S. 601 (1975).
U.S. 67 (1972).

See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), in which the
Court upheld a Louisiana procedure under which the seller of goods on an installment sales contract had enforced a vendor's lien by having the goods sequestered
without a prior hearing.
26 U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972).
27
See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973) (car repossession).
28 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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dressed a variant of the self-help procedure and held that the
debtors' complaint was properly dismissed on these grounds.
Flagg Brothers, Inc., a moving and storage company, had
gained possession of the complainants' furniture and household
belongings when each of them was evicted from her apartment.
Shirley Brooks' complaint averred:
13. When defendant Levister [the city marshal] appeared to remove plaintiff and her possessions from her
apartment on June 13, 1973, plaintiff informed defendant
Levister that she wanted to call someone to store her furniture and other household possessions. Defendant Levister
informed plaintiff that she couldn't get anyone to store her
furniture and that the man with him, defendant Flagg, was
the man who would store her furniture. Plaintiff was led
to believe by defendant Levister's comments that she had
no choice but to let defendant Flagg store her goods.
14. Defendant Flagg informed plaintiff that plaintiff
would have to pay $65 per month for the moving and
storage of the furniture. Plaintiff informed defendant
Flagg that this sounded like a high price, but believing
that she had no choice in the matter, told defendant Flagg
to proceed with the moving and storage of her furniture.
and household possessions. 29
Gloria Jones' complaint in intervention tells essentially the same
story, except she averred that she had "never . . . authorized de-

fendant Flagg Brothers, Inc. to store her furniture and household
possessions, either by written or oral contract, or otherwise." 80
Brooks and Jones soon became engaged in a dispute with Flagg
Brothers over the charges for storage. Eventually, Flagg Brothers
notified them of its intent to sell their goods as authorized by
section 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code: "[A]
warehouseman's lien may be enforced by public or private sale of
the goods in bloc or in parcels, at any time or place and on any
terms which are commercially reasonable, after notifying all persons
known to claim an interest in the goods." a1 Brooks and Jones
brought a federal class action seeking damages and injunctions
against the sale of their belongings. Relying on the Sniadach line
of cases, they argued that Flagg Brothers could not enforce the
29 Record at 10a.

sod.45a.
81 N.Y.U.C.C. §7-210(1) (McKinney 1964).
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warehouseman's lien without seeking a prior hearing to resolve
32
their disputes.
The district court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction, holding that Flagg Brothers' conduct was not that of the
state.88 The Second Circuit reversed.34 " Writing for the Court of
Appeals, Judge Bryan emphasized the change in the common law
made by section 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code
and its statutory predecessor:
[B]y enacting § 7-210, New York not only delegated to the
warehouseman a portion of its sovereign monopoly power
over binding conflict resolution, but also let him, by selling stored goods, execute a lien and thus perform a function which has traditionally been that of the sheriff.
This delegation expanded the warehouseman's remedies far beyond those existing at common law....
Were it not for this statute, the warehouseman would
stand in the position of any other creditor, i.e., he would
have to have the debts he claims he is owed judicially
established, and then have the sheriff execute upon the
goods which he concededly has a common law right to
hold as security. The action of the state in granting the
warehouseman the privileged position he enjoys under
§ 7-210 . . . drastically changes the balance of power be-

tween debtor and creditor. It permits complete circumvention of the judicial process, by installing the warehouseman as the final and interested judge of any disputes
over storage charges, and as the sheriff who will enforce
his own decisions. While we recognize generally the value
of preserving a sphere for private activity free from the
restrictions imposed upon the state by the fourteenth
amendment, it is plain that the state's conscious election to

delegate a portion of its uniquely'gbvernmental power to
the warehouseman in order to enhance his common law
position as creditor constitutes state action.m
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist. 36

Justice Marshall wrote a short dissenting opinion.

32 For reasons that are not clear from the opinions, Levister, the marshal, was
dismissed as a defendant with the complainants' consent, and nothing was made of
whatever colorable state authority Mr. Flagg enjoyed by virtue of his association
with the marshal.
33 Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
34 Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977).
35 Id. 771-72 (citations & footnotes omitted).
S 6 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices White
and Marshall. Justice Brennan did not participate.
1. Justice Rehnquist's Opinion for the Court
Justice Rehnquist found the situation "clearly distinguishable"
from North Georgia Finishing,Fuentes, and Sniadach:
In each of those cases a government official participated in
the physical deprivation of what had concededly been the
constitutional plaintiff's property under state law before
the deprivation occurred. The constitutional protection
attaches not because, as in North Georgia Finishing, a
clerk issued a ministerial writ out of the court, but because as a result of that writ the property of the debtor
was seized and impounded by the affirmative command of
the law of Georgia. The creditor in North Georgia
Finishing had not simply sought to pursue the collection
of his debt by private means permissible under Georgia
law; he had invoked the authority of the Georgia court,
which in turn had ordered the garnishee not to pay over
money which previously had been the property of the
debtor ....
...New York, unlike Florida in Fuentes, Georgia in
North Georgia Finishing,and Wisconsin in Sniadach, has
not ordered respondents to surrender any property whatever. It has merely enacted a statute which provides that
a warehouseman conforming to the provisions of the
3
statute may convert his traditional lien into good title. 7
The respondents argued that Flagg Brothers' conduct was attributable to the state because the state had (1) "delegated" to Flagg
"the resolution of private disputes," 38 and (2) "authorized and
encouraged" its conduct by enacting section 7-210.3 9 Justice Rehnquist responded that the delegation theory applied only to functions
'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,' "40 and that
[the] system of rights and remedies, recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have
delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerogative of
the sovereign....
37Id. 161-62 nn.10 & 11 (citation omitted).
38Id. 157.
39Id. 164.
40 Id. 157 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352

(1974)).
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...
[T]he settlement of disputes between debtors
and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function. Creditors and debtors have had available to them
historically a ...

[large] number of choices .

. .

.'

This passage is accompanied by three lengthy footnotes which
discuss the nature of state law and its relation to "self-help." Justice
Rehnquist begins with the positivist description of property rights
and the statement of the public/private distinction, both quoted
above in Part .42 After asserting the absence of state involvement
in Flagg Brothers' conduct, he emphasizes "the important part that
[self-help] remedies have played in our system of property rights." 43
Referring to creditors' liens in general, Justice Rehnquist portrays
Flagg Brothers' authority to sell the goods as arising from its private
property interest in the goods rather than from the state's conferral of power:
The conduct of private actors in relying on the rights
established under these liens to resort to self-help remedies
does not permit their conduct to be ascribed to the State.
Self-help of the type involved in this case is not
significantly different from creditor remedies generally,
whether created by common law or enacted by legislatures.
New York's statute has done nothing more than authorize
(and indeed limit)-without participation by any public
official-what Flagg Brothers would tend to do, even in the
absence of such authorization, i.e., dispose of respondents'
property in order to free up its valuable storage space.
The proposed sale pursuant to the lien in this case is not a
significant departure from traditional private arrangements. 44
Justice Rehnquist responds in similar terms to the claim that
"Flagg Brothers' proposed action is properly attributable to the
State because the State has authorized and encouraged it in enacting § 7-210." 4

Writing that "[t]his Court

. ..

has never held that

a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action
into that of the State," 46 he continues:
411d. 158, 160-62 (citations & footnotes omitted).
42

See supra text accompanying notes 6 & 18.

43436 U.S. at 162 n.11.
44 Id. 162 nn.h1 &12 (citations omitted).
45 Id.

46 Id.

164.
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It is quite immaterial that the State has embodied its
decision not to act in statutory form. If New York had
no commercial statutes at all, its courts would still be faced
with the decision whether to prohibit or to permit the sort
of sale threatened here the first time an aggrieved bailor
came before them for relief. A judicial decision to deny
relief would be no less an "authorization" or "encouragement" of that sale than the legislature's decision embodied
in this statute ....

If the mere denial of judicial relief is

considered sufficient encouragement to make the State responsible for those private acts, all private deprivations of
property would be converted into public acts whenever
the State, for whatever reason, denies relief sought by the
putative property owner.
...
[T]his notion [is] completely contrary to that
"essential dichotomy" between public and private acts ....
[T]he State of New York is in no way responsible for Flagg
Brothers' decision, a decision which the State in § 7-210
permits but does not compel, to threaten to sell these
respondents' belongings.
Here, the State of New York has not compelled the
sale of a bailor's goods, but has merely announced the
circumstances under which its courts will not interfere
with a private sale. Indeed, the crux of respondents' complaint is not that the State has acted, but that it has refused
to act. This statutory refusal to act is no different in
principle from an ordinary statute of limitations whereby
the State declines to provide a remedy for private deprivations of property after the passage of a given period of
4
time. 7
2. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
While Justice Rehnquist focused on Flagg Brothers' conduct,
Justice Stevens focused on the state legislation and on its delegation
of power to Flagg Brothers: "The State's conduct in this case takes
the concrete form of a statutory enactment, and it is this statute
that may be challenged." 48 Noting that "respondents have a property interest in the possessions that the warehouseman proposes to
sell," 49 and that the warehouseman's power to sell derives not from
471d.

165-66 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

48 436 U.S. at 176.

49Id. 169 (footnote omitted).

"Of course the warehouseman may also have

a property interest and the ultimate resolution of the due process issue will require
a balancing of these interests." Id. 169 n.1 (citation omitted).
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contracts with the respondents, but from section 7-210,50 Justice
Stevens posed the question presented by Flagg Brothers as "whether
a state statute which authorizes a private party to deprive a person
of his property without his consent must meet the requirements of
the Due Process Clause .... . 51 For Justice Stevens,
[t]his question must be answered in the affirmative unless
the State has virtually unlimited power to transfer interests in private property without any procedural protections.
. . . Under this approach a State could enact laws
authorizing private citizens to use self-help in countless
situations without any possibility of federal challenge. A
state statute could authorize the warehouseman to retain
all proceeds of the lien sale, even if they far exceeded the
amount of the alleged debt; it could authorize finance
companies to enter private homes to repossess merchandise; or indeed, it could authorize "any person with sufficient physical power" [quoting the Court] to acquire and
sell the property of his weaker neighbor .... The Court's
rationale would characterize action pursuant to such a
statute as purely private action, which the State permits
but does not compel, in an area not exclusively reserved
2
to the State.
Stevens contested the majority's view that only the delegation
of an "exclusive" state function amounted to state action. The
proper question, rather, was "whether the State has delegated a
function traditionally and historically associated with sovereignty," 13
and his answer was that "the nonconsensual transfer of property
rights is . . . a traditional function of the sovereign." 5 Justice
Stevens understood the garnishment cases to reflect this view.55 State
action came not from the clerk's ministerial role in signing the order,
but from the "State's role in defining and controlling the debtorcreditor relationship" 56; the constitutional defect inhered in the
unsupervised delegation to private parties of the "state power to
achieve a nonconsensual resolution of a commercial dispute": 57
50

"[P]etitioners conceded in this Court that, taking respondents' allegations as
fact, as we must, there is no contractual issue in this case." Id. 169 n.2.

51 Id. 169.
52Id. 169-70.
53 Id. 171.
54 Id.171-72.
55 Id. 171-76.
56 Id. 174 (emphasis in original).

57id.
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[W]e expect government "to provide a reasonable and fair
framework of rules which facilitate commercial transactions .

. . ."

This "framework of rules" is premised on

the assumption that the State will control nonconsensual
deprivations of property and that the State's control will,
in turn, be subject to the restrictions of the Due Process
Clause.as
Justice Stevens found it ironic that "the very defect that made
the statutes in Shevin and North Georgia Finishing unconstitutional-lack of state control-is, under today's decision, the factor
that precludes constitutional review of the state statute." 19
B. State and Private Action in the Creditors' Remedies Precedents
Where was the state action in Sniadach and North Georgia
Finishing that the Court found missing in Flagg Brothers? The
Wisconsin and Georgia laws struck down in the two earlier cases
provided for prejudgment attachments ancillary to an action
brought by the creditor against the debtor. In Wisconsin the clerk
of court issued a summons ordering the garnishee "to retain such
property.

. .

and make no payment . . . to the principal defendant

pending the further order of the court." 00 The garnishment order
was effective when the garnishee was served with the summons and
various other papers. In Georgia
[t]he plaintiff

. . .

shall make affidavit before some officer

authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any
court of record in which the said garnishment is being
filed or in which the main case is filed, stating the amount
claimed to be due in such action . . . and that he has

reason to apprehend the loss of the same or some part
thereof unless process of garnishment shall issue. 61
Upon the creditor's filing a bond for twice the amount alleged due,
the official issued a garnishment summons.
This was the full extent of state involvement in the creditors'
remedies. How did it differ from the state's involvement in Flagg
Brothers? Justice Rehnquist's answer 62 is both confusing and unpersuasive. He begins by observing that "[i]n each of those cases a
government official participated in the physical deprivation" of the
8 Id. 178-79 (citations &footnotes omitted).
69 Id. 175.
6
o Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 175, 154 N.W.2d 259, 265
(1968).

6115 Ga. Code Ann. 46-102 (1965) (amended 1977).
62 See supra text accompanying note 37.
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complainant's property.8 3 "Physical deprivation" accurately describes the action taken in Fuentes, where the sheriff went to the
debtors' home and actually seized their goods. In Sniadach and
North Georgia Finishing, however, the debtors' property was intangible, as was the process of seizing it.
What "government official" participated in the deprivation in
Sniadach and North Georgia Finishing? Only the clerk was involved, and, as Justice Rehnquist himself suggests, the clerk's participation was of no moment: "The constitutional protection attaches not because ... a clerk issued a ministerial writ out of the
court .... ,,64 In this respect, Rehnquist seems to agree with
Stevens, who remarked on the large "number of private actions in
which a government functionary plays some ministerial role" and
on the pecularity of basing constitutional review "on the fortuity
of such governmental intervention." 115It is worth taking a moment
to see why the Justices are correct.
Suppose that a state law permits a creditor who files the requisite documents with the clerk to serve a paper demanding that an
employer or bank attach the debtor's salary or bank account. This
paper is binding without the signature of any official; a garnishee
who fails to comply is liable to the creditor for amounts that should
have been but were not attached. 66 Here the creditor's "demand"
is functionally identical to the clerk's "order" issued upon the
creditor's filing of the proper papers. In neither case has any official
adjudication or other discretionary proceeding taken place. In
both cases the garnishee who fails to comply acts at the risk of liability, ultimately imposed by a state court. In short, the existence
of a piece of paper called an "order," routinely issued by a clerk,
is of no operational significance.
Justice Rehnquist goes on, however, to assert that in North
GeorgiaFinishingstate action inheres in the effect of the writ: The
creditor has "invoked the authority of the Georgia court"; he has
invoked the "affirmative command of the law of Georgia." 67 This
seems a more promising source of state action. It may be significant
that a state court or, more generally, state law, has ordered someone
to do something. Even without the prior involvement of an official,
63 436 U.S. at 161 n.1O.
64 Id.

65 Id. 174.

66 This appears to have been the only consequence of a Wisconsin garnishee's
failure to comply with the garnishment order. In Georgia, the noncomplying
garnishee was potentially subject to punishment for contempt.
67 436 U.S. at 161 n.10.

1312

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:12.96

the state stands contingently ready to aid a creditor who follows the
proper garnishment procedures by threatening to impose sanctions
on a noncomplying garnishee. Doubtless, the threat usually induces compliance.
Why should this subject the transaction to fourteenth amendment requirements of procedural due process? The usual answer
goes something like this: Government officials exercise great power;
their exercises of power are subject to corruption, abuse, and error;
the requirements of procedural due process are accordingly designed
to constrain their discretion. When the state lends (the threat of)
its enforcement processes to a creditor, the creditor's self-interested
determination that the debtor is in default must, a fortiori, be sub68
ject to the constraints of procedural due process.
How, then, does the state's role in self-help cases compare with
its role in the garnishment cases discussed above? The apparent
difference is this: In the garnishment cases, the state's threat of
sanctions aids the creditor in gaining possession of the debtor's
property, while in the self-help cases the state merely grants the
creditor the power or right to keep or dispose of property that he
came into possession of without the state's assistance. Does this
difference justify characterizing the creditor's action as "state action"
in one instance but not the other? I think not.
Let me begin with an example-a highly atypical one, I thinkin which the state assumes a hands-off attitude toward debtors' and
creditors' claims to the property. Suppose that the law permits a
debtor and creditor to engage in an ongoing game of capture-thesecurity: Any creditor with a lien against a debtor's property may
grab and sell it if he can, and any debtor whose property is seized
by a creditor may grab it back and keep it if she can. Within this
little state of nature, exempt from the usual rules that forbid us
from taking whatever we think is ours or can get away with, one
might conceivably say that the State has not acted when the property
changes hands. In such a situation, of course, title would never
be settled; indeed, the concept of "property" as we know it would
not exist, and the concepts of "creditor" and "debtor" would lose
definition. It seems likely that the state would eventually be called
upon to impose stability or to assure that the strongest did not end
up with everything.
Suppose, however, that the state intervenes to protect one or
the other party's possession, once he or she has gained it. For
6 8 1f the due process clause applied, procedures employed by self-helping
creditors would surely fail to meet one of its most elementary requirements-that

one not be the judge of one's own cause.
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example, suppose that tne state threatens to punishMrs. Brooks if
she engages in some self-help of her own by sneaking into Flagg
'Brothers' warehouse and liberating her goods,, or if she obstructs
'the public auction at which Flagg Brothers seeks to sell her goods.
Although the state did not assist the creditor in gaining possession,
it treats his possession as the occasion for transferring to him,"and
protecting against the debtor, property interests '(the rights to possess and dispose of the goods) that were formerly the debtor's. Even
if the creditor's gaining of possession cannot be characterized as
action of the state, the state surely acts when it protects the possessory interest once gained. Unless positivism includes a covert
tenet that possession is nine points of the law, the rationale for
procedural due process does not seem less applicable to this exercise
of state power than to the exercise of power to induce' the transfer
of possession.
At this point, a critic might respond that if the state's protection of the creditor's possession makes his possession state action,
then state action inheres in every assertion of a property interest.
For there is no conceptual or structural difference between the
state's protection of the creditor's possession against the debtor, and
its protection of anyone's possession against another's claim of right
(or, indeed, against another's attempt to gain possession without
such a claim, for example, by theft). This is a dilemma of the
constitutional positivist's own making, however. In "any case, it
fails as a reductio argument against ubiquitous state action: The
finding of state action in virtually all acts of possession hardly entails that anyone who claims an interest in property is entitled to a
hearing before the possessor disposes of it. That is a question of
substantive policy-as was the question whether the debtors in the
garnishment cases were constitutionally entitled to a prior hearing.
This brings me to one more distinction that Justice Rehnquist
draws between Flagg Brothers and the creditors' remedies precedents. In the earlier cases, he writes, the state participated in a
"deprivation of what had concededly been the constitutional plaintiff's property under state law before the deprivation occurred";
the assets attached in North GeorgiaFinishing"previously had been
the property of the debtor." 69 This is presumably in contrast to
Flagg Brothers, where the moving and storage company, as well as
the complainants, had a property interest-a lien-in their stored
goods.
69 436 U.S. at 161 n.1O.
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This analysis ignores the fact that Mrs. Brooks and Mrs. Jones
continued to have a property interest in the goods held by Flagg
Brothers. 70 The distinction is even more fundamentally flawed,
however. First, to hold that "ownership" goes to whether there was
"state action" rather than to whether the complainants had a sufficient property interest in the goods to entitle them to a hearing is
to conflate the "no state shall" and "deprive of property" phrases
of the due process clause. This denies any autonomy to state action
doctrine by subordinating it to questions of substantive law-in this
case, the law of property. It is, in effect, a confession of the
doctrine's bankruptcy.
Second, for a positivist of any ilk, Mrs. Sniadach's claim that
the Family Finance Company took her property, however intuitively appealing, is premised on an incomplete description of the
interests in her salary. A fuller description would include the
finance company's potential right to some or all of it: Conditional
sales contracts of the sort involved in Fuentes often explicitly grant
the seller-creditor a continuing property interest in the goods sold.
Indeed, a thoroughgoing constitutional positivist who reached the
merits of Sniadach, Fuentes, or North Georgia Finishing would
readily uphold the state procedures. As Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy demonstrates, constitutional
positivism collapses procedural into substantive due process; the
debtors' claims in the earlier creditors' remedies cases would
founder on the positivist's question, "what property have you been
deprived of?" Put in another (positivist) way, Mrs. Sniadach had a
constitutionally cognizable property interest only because the Court
accorded her one; Mrs. Brooks lacks such an interest only because
the Court chooses not to grant one to her.
The creditors' remedies precedents, then, must have been responsive to nonpositivist conceptions of procedural due processperhaps conceptions that accord weight to values such as "dignity"
and "participation." 71 If Flagg Brothers is distinguishable, the
difference is not a qualitative one: The concerns that require a
hearing before the state assists a creditor in gaining possession of
the debtor's property are also present when the, state protects Flagg
Brothers' retention and disposition of property that Mrs. Brooks
turned over only for temporary storage.
70 Justice Rehnquist concedes that the respondents did have such an interest,

id. 160 n.1O, but his analysis ignores its effect.
71

See supra note 9.
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III. LAWMAKING AS STATE ACTION

Does a state's mere legislative authorization of, -or acquiescence
in, private conduct amount to "state action"? Justice Stevens finds
state action in the governmental power underlying New York's
legislative policy permitting self-help repossession: "The, State's
conduct in this case takes the concrete form of a ,statutory enactment, and it is that statute that may be challenged." 72 For justice
Rehnquist, any claim of state action must be based on the status
or conduct of the moving and storage company itself. Mrs., Brooks
"must establish not only that Flagg Brothers acted under color of
the challenged statute, but also that its actions are properly attributable to the State of New York." 73 it is worth repeating Justice
Rehnquist's response to Justice Stevens' characterization of the issue
in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of
our previous cases, the notion of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence
of a body of property law in a State, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though no
state process or state officials were ever involved in -enforcing that body of law.7 4
Justice Rehnquist captures a theme strongly implicit in the
body of state action doctrine. Nonetheless, there are several situations in which the Court has implicitly found state action in the
mere existence of laws-laws not enforced against the complainant
or, indeed, enforced at all.
A. Equal Protection Claims
Suppose that section 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code read as it does, but required a hearing before the sale
where commercial rather than household goods were involved.
Suppose that Mrs. Brooks' federal complaint averred that, whether
or not the due process clause required New York to grant a hearing
to anyone, the statutory distinction between personal belongings
and commercial goods violated the equal protection clause.
:Whatever the merits of this or any similar equal protection
claim, this much is clear: First, the complaint would be treated as
72 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 176 (1978).
73 Id. 156.
74 Id. 160 n.10.
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directed against the legislation itself and not against Flagg Brothers.
Second, the existence of "state action" would be assumed without
discussion, even though no state process was being enforced against
Mrs. Brooks.
A court would justify adjudicating this claim on the merits by
invoking a rationale for the equal protection clause along these
lines: The clause is designed to prevent the state from inequitably
preferring some citizens to others, or, more fundamentally, to prevent one group from capturing control of government and exploiting other groups to its own advantage. However one describes it,
the equal protection clause is concerned with comparative treatment, and for this reason a citizen has a grievance not only when
she-is unfairly burdened but also when she is denied a benefit
accorded others. In short, the purpose and structure of the doctrine
explain why "the mere existence of a body of property law in a
State" amounts to state action when it is challenged on equal protection grounds.
B. Claims Based on Retroactivity
Suppose that the contract between Mrs. Brooks and Flagg
Brothers had explicitly provided that, in the event of a dispute, the
storage company must apply for a judicial hearing before selling
her goods. The New York legislature now passes a law relieving
storage companies of such contractual obligations even with 'respect
to the sale of goods under existing contracts. Mrs. Brooks sues
Flagg Bothers in federal court, averring that the state law impairs
Flagg Brothers' obligations of contract in violation of article I,
section 10 of the Constitution: "No State shall

. . .

pass any . . .

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 75
The court would treat this as a complaint not about Flagg
Brothers' conduct, but about the legislation, and would, entertain
the suit without questioning the existence of state action. For,
though I have perversely exchanged the traditional roles of debtor
and creditor, Mrs. Brooks has filed the paradigmatic contract clause
complaint: State legislation has impaired the obligations of an existing contract. From Sturges v. Crowninshield76 in 1819 to Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell77 in 1934 and since, the
Court has adjudicated such cases, under the due process clause 7s
70 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
76 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
77290 U.S. 398 (1934) (the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case).
78 Although the contract clause does not apply to the federal government,
courts have treated Congress's release of a private party from contractual claims as
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as well as the contract clause, without questioning the existence of
"state action"-indeed, without uttering the phrase.
.
The nature of a contract clause claim may explain the intuition of state action: the legislature has changed the law, frustrating
the creditor's legitimate expectations.. On the merits, this may seem
a special circumstance even to a constitutional positivist,.who, while
according the state virtually plenary discretion- to .order property
relations prospectively, would hold (perhaps for utilitarian or
Kantian reasons) that the state must honor whatever interests it has
once created. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that the Istate is not
enforcing any law. Indeed, its nonenforcement is the basis of the
obligee's constitutional complaint.
...

C. Substantive Due Process and Uncohpensated Takings
Recall Justice Stevens' parade of horribles; Under the Court's
analysis, he wrote, "a State could enact laws authorizing private
citizens to use self-help in countless situations without any possibility of federal challenge. A state statute . . . could authorize
'any person with sufficient physical power' to acquire and sell the
property of his weaker neighbor." 79 On Stevens' view, the Constitution imposes substantive limitations on the state's power to
define private property interests. -As support, he might invoke
AFL v. Swing,80 which invalidated, essentially on first amendment
grounds, a state court order issued on ant employer's behalf enjoining peaceful labor picketing. And he could cite the more recent
line of decisions, beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 '
imposing first amendment constraints on state defamation law.
These decisions differ from Justice Stevens' examples in two
ways, however. They involve a relatively specific constitutional
provision (the first amendment), while Stevens' examples sound in
due process. Moreover, Swing and New York .Times constrain state
courts from "acting" by entering judgments altering th7e status quo
between the parties. In Justice Stevens' examples,, the state is not
acting when he thinks it should; it is leaving the parties as it
82
finds them.
a deprivation of property sounding in due process.- See, e.g., Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1948).
79 436 U.S. at 170 (citation omitted).
80 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
813 76 U.S. 254 (1964).
"
82 There is another distinction, but one -that-.the mnodem-, court does not find

salient: Justice Stevens' examples are of legislation, while'"most bf.the cases involving picketing and defamation have involved judge-made rules...
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Although there is at least one contemporary precedent, 83 the
clearest instance of. a holding that judicial inactioi can deprive
someone of property without due process comes from the era of
economic due process. In Truax v. Corrigan84 the Court struck
down an Arizona statute that forbade judges from issuing injunctions to prohibit peaceful picketing in labor disputes. The essence
of Chief Justice Taft's opinion appears in these -sentences:
Plaintiffs' business is a property, right . . . and free

access for employees, owner and customers to his place of
business is incident to such right. Intentional injury
caused to either right or both by a conspiracy is a tort..
A law which operates to make lawful such a wrong as
is described in plaintiffs' complaint deprives the ovner of
the business and the premises of his property without due
process .....
It is argued' that, while the right to conduct a lawful
business is property, the conditions surrounding that business, such as regulations of the State for maintaining
peace, good order, and protection against disorder, are
matters in which no person has a vested right. The conclusion to which this inevitably leads in this case is that
the State may withdraw all protection to a property
right by civil or criminal action for its wrongful injury if
the injury is not caused by violence ....

It is true, that no

one has a vested right in any particular rule of the common law, but it is also true that the legislative power of a
State, can only be exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty
of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended
to preserve ....

Swing in effect overruled Truax and substantially required
states to adopt the Arizona policy invalidated by the Taft Court.
What has changed during the intervening decades? For one thing,
the particular rights that the Court is prepared to protect. The
Taft Court's solicitude for property and contract has been superseded by concerns for free speech, equal protection, and the like.
Second, the natural rights jurisprudence embodied in Truax-a
83

See infratext accompanying notes 89-95.

257 U.S. 312 .(1921).
s Id. 327-29 (citations omitted).
84
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view under which some property rights have the status of higher
law so that the state's nonprotection of those rights is tantamount
to a deprivation of property without due process-has become
problematic for the modern Court.
Traces of the natural rights view still can be found in state
decisions addressing the constitutionality of statutes that modify
common law rules of liability for car accidents and medical malpractice.86 Analogous issues have arisen in two contemporary
Supreme Court decisions. Although the Court denied the constitutional claims in both cases, it is noteworthy that it simply assunied
the existence of state action.
In one of these cases, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,8 7 the Court upheld the Price-Anderson Act's
$560 million limitation of liability for nuclear accidents caused by
power plants. Chief Justice Burger dealt only briefly with the due
process objection that the provision "fails to' provide those injured
by a nuclear accident with a satisfactory quid pro quo for the common-law rights of recovery which the Act abrogates":
Initially, it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause
in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or
provide a reasonable substitute remedy. However, we
need not resolve this question here since the Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it
replaces.88
The more interesting case is PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins,8 9 which grew out of a series of state action decisions concerning constitutional constraints on the power of shopping centers
to exclude picketers and leafleters. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,9 . the -Court held that a
shopping center acted as the state and was bound by the first and
fourteenth amendments. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black
expressed a constitutional concern for the shopping center's property rights:
[T]he Constitution recognizes and supports the concept of
private ownership of property. The Fifth Amendment
8

6 See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).

87438 U.S. 59 (1978).
88 Id. 87-88 (fooatnotes omitted).
89447 U.S. 74 (1980).

90 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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means to me -that there is no right to picket -on "the
private 15remises of an6ther. to try to convert the owner or
others, to the views of the pickets. It also means, I think,
that if this Court is going to arrogate to itself the power
to act as: the Government's agent 'to take a part of Weis'
property to give-to the pickets for their use, the Court
should also award Weis just compensation for the property
taken. 91

Logan Valley was limited severely four years later by Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner,92 and was formally overruled in 1976. 93 Justice Powell,
writing for the Court in Lloyd Corp., echoed Justice Black's concerns that "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private
property owners... must be respected and protected." 94
The respondents in PruneYard were students, prohibited by
.the shopping center's guards .from distributing leaflets on the
premises. In an action brought by the leafleters against PruneYard,
the California Supreme Court held for the complainants.. The
court acknowledged that, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
the privately owned shopping center was not 'bound by the first
and fourteenth amendments. But it interpreted the California
Constitution to permit "speech- and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately
owned," 95 and it rejected the shopping center's argument that such
a holding constituted a "taking" of property without just compensation or a deprivation without due process.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed on
the merits. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist easily concluded that the California policy was not so burdensome or unreasonable as-to violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments. He
also asserted what is in effect the federalist corollary of constitutional positivism-that "as a -general proposition . . . the United

States, as opposed to the several States, [is not] possessed of' residual
authority that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance." 96
Justice Blackmun joined in the Court's opinion. except- for the
sentence just quoted.97 Justice Marshall concurred at some length.
91 Id. 330.

-

92 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
93 Hudgens v,. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
94407 U.S. at 570.

95 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979).
96 447 U.S. at 84.
971d.

88-89.
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He linked the case to the "question of whether, and to what extent
a State may abrogate or modify common-law- rights."
Appellants' claim in this case amounts to no less than
a suggestion that the common law .oftrespass is not subject
to revision by the State

....

' If accepted, that claim would

"represent a return to the era of.Lochner ....
On the other hand, I do not understand the-Court to
suggest that, rights of property are to be,defined solely by
state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier
to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a
state government. The constitutional terms "life, liberty,
and property" do not derive their meaning solely from
the provisions of positive law. They have a*normative
dimension as well, establishing a sphere 'of private: autonomy which government is bound to respect. Quite
serious constitutional questions might be raised 'if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of commonlaw rights in some general way.98
"State action" was never mentioned in PruneYard. Perhaps
the posture of the case and the relief granted (the California court
enjoined the shopping center from excluding- the leafleters) made
it apparent that the state was acting. But from what I can glean
from the state and federal court'opinions, the case would not have
been treated differently if the shopping center -had brought an
action to enjoin -the leafleting and relief: had been denied. In
essence, the Supreme Court viewed Prune.Yard as an inverse condemnation action, treating the shopping ce'nter's claim like those
of the property, owners insuch cases'as.-United State's v. Causby q
and Griggs v. Allegheny County,1 0jin. which it required that compensation be paid for the 'diminution of property values caused by
low:flying aircraft. In other words, the state -action at issue in
PruneYard was nothing more than'a'state property rule.
Although the equal protection and contract clause cases seem
remote from the .issue in Flagg Brothers, the .takings and -substantive due process cases. are closely related; and they contradict- Justic6
Rehnquist's assertion that "the mere existence of a'body of property
law in a State

. .;

[does. not] itself amount[ ].to 'state action' eve-n

though no state ,process 6r state officials. were ever involved in en98 Id. 93-94 (footnote omitted).

99 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
100

369 U.S. 84 (1962).

-
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How could the Court deny the

existence of state action in Flagg Brothers when state action had
been assumed without question in PruneYard?
IV.

THE PERSISTENCE OF STATE ACTION

The preceding sections have examined two doctrinal issues
presented by Flagg Brothers v. Brooks: 102 whether the moving and
storage company's self-help enforcement of the warehouseman's lien
constitutes state- action, -and whether the existence of a state law
(in this case, section 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial
Code) that permits self-help enforcement is state action. With
respect to the first, I have argued that there is no conceptual difference between the state involvement in cases such as Sniadach v.
Family Finance C6rp.,103 in which the threat of sanctions aids the
creditor in gaining possession of the debtor's property, and Flagg
Brothers, in which the threat of sanctions aids the creditor.in maintaining possession of and control over property already in his possession but claimed by the debtor. With respect to the second, I
have shown that, "the mere existence, of a body of property law"
sometimes does- amount to. state action, and more particularly that
the Court has implicitly found state action in laws that distribute
property interests among citizens in situations, such as PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins,104 that are not readily distinguishable
from Flagg Brothers.
Having done with doctrinal arguments, it remains to account
for the intuition that there are nonetheless some differences. Let
me suggest two related possibilities, one having to do with "change,"
the other with "consent" and more broadly with the value of individual autonomy in our society.
In our everyday life we notice change and movement, while
things that do not change fade into the background. It is consistent that we perceive the state as involved in our affairs when it
assists in changing the status quo, and not when it assists in maintaining it. The invention of the phrase "state action" to describe
the ambit of the fourteenth amendment reflects and buttresses the
distinction. This probably underlies the perception of greater state
involvement in Sniadach than in Flagg Brothers, but it does not
distinguish the latter case from PruneYard. In any event, I do not
find the distinction persuasive.
101 436 U.S. at 160 n.1O.
102 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
103 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
104 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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The role that consent plays in state action doctrine is illustrated by a comparison of AFL v. Swing 105 and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 106 with Shelley v. Kraemer 07 (a suit to enforce a
racially restrictive covenant) and Bell v. Maryland"08 (a .criminal
trespass prosecution against blacks who had, refused to leave a
"white" restaurant when denied service). All four cases involved
private litigation in which-state courts entered judgments against
the defendants. In Swing and New York Times the existence of
state action was not doubted, for ,the courts were enforcing substantive state policies. State action was problematic in Shelley and
Bell,10 9 however, because the courts were perceived to be enforcing
..
the results of consensual private ordering.
The doctrinal importance of consent reflects our psychological
-and ideological need to believe that there are essentially private
realms, albeit circumscribed by state and society, in which actions
are autonomous. To treat all relations among individuals as state
action contradicts any sense we have of such autonomy and denies
its very possibility. We therefore tend to view the law of contracts
as merely the given background against which private consensual
transactions can take place.
This partly explains why state action is readily assumed in
PruneYard and other inverse condemnation cases *and why it is
thought problematic in the creditors' remedies cases. In the former
cases the state is imposing a (nonconsensual) order on private relations. In the latter, the debtor is assumed to have implicitly consented to existing common law or statutory remedies. by not contracting out of them.
"Consent" does not explain the different outcomes in Sniadach
and Flagg Brothers, however-especially with respect to Mrs. Jones'
complaint, which specifically averred that' she had not agreed to
have her goods stored."0 Even if the contracts signed by the debtors
had referred to the remedies available to the creditors, this would
not entail that the debtors had "consented" to them 'in a psychologically, politically, or constitutionally adequate way. For example,
105 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
106 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

See supra text accompanying note 80.
See supra text accompanying note 81.

107334 U.S. 1 (1948).
108 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
109 Although in Shelley the Court found that judicial enforcement of the
covenant was unconstitutional state action, that finding was and continues to be
controversial. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 10. .And in Bell, as in other sit-in
cases of the period, the Court assiduously ducked the state actidn question.
110 436 U.S. at 160. This apparently struck the Court as so atypical '(or;
perhaps, unbelievable) that it ignored the claim.
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it would remain open to question whether the debtors had "knowingly and 'intentionally" placed their -personal belongings under
the creditor's unilateral control."'
If'Conceptions of change and consent do not provide adequate
explanations -for the state action: doctrine, perhaps the doctrine may
be instrumental to other legal,political, or social aims., The very
existence of the. doctrine -serves' as a limitation on the exercise of
judicial power-especially federal judicial power-and the doctrine
may therefore be thoughtto protect the autonomy of individuals
and legislatures from judicial intrusion, and the autonomy of the
states nrim federal intt-sion.
Assessing whether thestate action doctrine actually serPies these
unnetions requires'at least two inquiries. First, one must measure
the-results of applying the doctrine against those entailed by a substantive theory of constitutional constraints-a theory that indicates
what (if -any) conduct 6f individuals, associations, corporations, and
privatelyowried public utilities should be subject to the free speech,
equal' protection; and due, process clauses. Second, one must dejenirie wh'ether the state action doctrine' is more administerable
(or less manipulable) than addressing these substantive questions
dire(tly.
The first inquiy lies well beyond'the scope of this essay. Although the second is 'familiar ground, it is worth mentioning four
somewhat different approaches to state action: "sifting and 'weighing," "authorization and encouragement," "delegation of public
fuinction," and "fifrnialism,"
The first of the four approaches was articulated by Justice
Clark, who Wrote -ir'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 112
M,
1 See- D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), which, while
upholding a corporatiofi's waiver bf a hearing on a cognovit note, implied that the
due process clause requires scrutiny of the debtor's supposed contractual waiver of
a hearing. Writing for-the, Court, Justice Blackmun assumed for purposes of argument that any waiyer must be "knowingly and intelligently made," but held that this
standard was met, emphasizing that the'complainant was a large corporation bargaining on equal terms with the holder of the note. He noted that "where the contract
is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where
the debtor receives nothing- for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences
may ensue." Id. 188. In Fuentes- v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972), see supra
text accompanying note 24, the Court quoted this language approvingly and emphasized the different bargaining posture of the parties, but held that there had
been no consent of any sort.
12365 U.S. 715 (1961).. The case involved the refusal of a coffee slop, located in a municipally. owned and operated parking garage, to serve'black custoiners. The-Court was concerned, among other things, with the symbolic involvement of the state in the putatively private activity. Under a theory of the equal
pkcte~tion clause going back' at- least' to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v,
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896), the insult -or stigma inflicted when the
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that "to fashion and' apply a precise formula for recognition of state,
responsibility' under the&Equal Protection Clausfi is
'impossible
task' .... Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can
the nonobvious involvement of the State in private 'conduct be attributed its true significance." "1 This diffef's from Justice Stewart's,
famous "I know it when I see it" standard: fbr "judging obsceniit "4
mainly in the comparative precision of the la.tteir:
The complainants "inFlagg Brothers relied. on the different
strategy articulated by the Court in Reilman'v. Mulkey 15 when
they argued that -section 7-210"of' the New York Uniform Commercial Code'implicated the state in the warehouse's self-help by
"authorizing" and "encouraging" the private conduct. Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that private action "compelled" or
"ordered" by the state is tantamount to state action, but -isserttd
that "a State's mere acquiescence in a private action" does not convert it into state action. 116 With respect to the issue in Flagg
Brothers he wrote:'
If New York had no commercial statutes at all' its courts
would still be faced with the decision whether to prohibit
or to permit the sort of sale threatened here the first lime
an aggrieved bailor came befdre them for relief. A judir
cial decision to deny relief would be no less an "authorization" or "encouragement" of that sale than the legislature's decision embodied in this statute ....

If the mere

denial of judicial relief is considered sufficient encouragement to make the State responsible for those private acts,
all private deprivations of property would be converted
into public acts whenever the State, for whatever. reason,
denies relief sought by the putative property owner.. 17
This seems essentially correct, and Reitman itself is widely understood to illustrate the malleability 'of the "authorization and encouragement" approach.
state expresses thd View that some racial 'groups are superior to others renders the
expression unconstitutional without regard to any material consequences that may
accompany or be caused by the expression.
"3
365 U.S. at 722 (citation omitted).
14 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"5

387 U.S. 369 (1967).

In Reitman the Court afirmed the California Su-

preme Court's invalidation on equal protection grounds of an amendment to the
California Constitution which repealed the state's fair-housing laws and prohibited
their future enactment by the legislature. The Court 'agreed with 'the Califo-nia
high court that the amendment "was intended to authorize, and does authorize,
racial discrimination . . .." Id. 381.
I'd 436 U.S. at 164.
117 Id. 165.
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The "delegation of a public function" approach originated in
Marsh v. Alabama,"8 in which the Court held that the first amendment prevented the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation from prohibit-.
ing a Jehovah's Witness to speak within the limits of its company
town, and in the White Primary Cases-Nixon v. Condon 119 and
Terry v. Adams 220-which held that political parties and clubs must
permit blacks to vote in internal elections that effectively determined the outcome of state elections. These decisions have been
thought to establish that operating a town and running state and
local elections are intrinsically governmental functions and, hence,
constitute state action no matter who performs them. The complainants in Flagg Brothers argued, along these lines, that section
7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code delegated a
public function to the moving and storage company. As Justice
Stevens wrote in dissent, the "power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and creditor" is a
public function, and "the State's delegation of that power to a
private party is, accordingly, subject to due process scrutiny." 121
Justice Rehnquist responded that the "delegation" theory applied only to functions " 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State.' "122
With respect to the situation in Flagg Brothers he
wrote:
[T]he proposed sale by Flagg Brothers under § 7-210 is not
the only means of resolving this purely private dispute.
The system of rights and remedies, recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have
delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerogative of the
sovereign.
...[T]he settlement of disputes between debtors and
creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function.
Creditors and debtors have had available to them historically a far wider number of choices than has one who
would be an elected public official, or a member of
118326 U.S. 501 (1946).
119286 U.S. 73 (1932).
120

345 U.S. 461 (1953).

121 436 "U.S. at 176.

122 436 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974), which held that a privately owned public
utility's decision to terminate service to a customer was not constrained by fourteenth amendment standards of due process. Among the complainant's arguments
was that the utility performed a "public function" and that this subjected it to con-

stitutional limitations).
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Jehovah's Witnesses who wished to distribute literature in

123
Chickasaw, Ala., at the time Marsh was decided.
Justice Rehnquist's argument contains, and pehraps depends

on, an ambiguity. -His claim is that Flagg Brothers is not performing "an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign." i2 But here, and
in the excerpt quoted immediately below, he focuses on the. exclusivity of the prerogative of the private actors, that is, on their
effective monopolistic power over the constitutional complainants.
Although this confusion is not inevitable, it exemplifies a structural
defect in any '"public function" analysis: Any characterization of
the archetypal public function and the private activity supposedly
fitting into the archetype is inherently indeterminate. Consider,
for example, Justice Rehnquist's description of the White Primary
Cases and Marsh and his comparison of them with Flagg Brothers:
While the Constitution protects private rights of association and advocacy with regard to the election of public
officials, our cases make it clear that the conduct of the
elections themselves is an exclusively public function....
The doctrine . . . encompasses only . . . elections con-

ducted by organizations which in practice produce "the
uncontested choice of public officials." . .
...
Just as the Texas Democratic Paity in Smith and
the Jaybird Democratic Association in Terry -effectively
performed the entire public function of selecting public
officials, so too the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. performed all
the necessary municipal functions in the town of Chickasaw, Ala., which it owned....
These two branches of the public function doctrine
have in common the feature of exclusivity. Although the
elections held by-the Democratic Party and its affiliates
were the only meaningful elections in Texas, and the
streets owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. were the
only streets in Chickasaw, the proposed sale by Flagg
Brothers under § 7-2 10 is not the only means of resolving
this purely private dispute. Respondent Brooks never has
alleged that state law barred her from seeking a waiver of
Flagg Brothers' right to sell her goods at the time she
authorized their storage. Presumably, respondent Jones,
who alleges that she never authorized the storage of her
goods, could have sought to replevy her goods at any time
under state law.'2
Id. 160-62 (citations omitted).
Id. 160 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
1251Id. 158-60 (citations & footnotes omitted).
123
124

,
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While "conducting" a local government election certainly
seems a uniquely governmental function, influencing or even determining the outcome of a local government election does not.
Formally, the democratic clubs did not perform a governmental
function. But they had the same effect: their elections "were the
only meaningful elections in Texas." But if the issue in those cases
was "meaningfulness," why isn't that the issue in Flagg Brothers as
well? Brooks could, in theory, have obtained a waiver-just as
blacks could, in theory, have gained admission to the political clubs.
120
The chances were probably the same in both cases.
What government function did the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp.
perform "exclusively"? Justice Rehnquist quotes Justice Black's
assertion that Chickasaw possessed "all the attributes of a town, i.e.,
'residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal
plant and a 'business block' on which business places are
situated.' '127

Chickasaw apparently was not a municipal corpora-

tion, however, nor did the company perform all of the functions
that are often undertaken by municipalities-such as holding elections, taxing, and operating public libraries, schools, and other
28
facilities.
While Justice Rehnquist focused on exclusivity, Justice Stevens
focused on the tradition of the state's exercise of power to resolve
debtor-creditor disputes. Like Judge Bryan in the Court of Appeals,
he emphasized the relative novelty of the self-help renedy and its departure from the practice at common law. As Judge Bryan noted,
however, New York had permitted creditors' self-help since 1879.129
126

As Justice Marshall pointed out ifi dissent, the requirement of posting a

bond of twice the value of the goods effectively precluded Mrs. Jones from
replevying, her goods- "While the Court is technically correct that respondent
'could have sought' replevin, it is also true that, given adequate funds, respondent
could have paid her rent and remained in her apartment, thereby avoiding eviction and the seizure of her household goods by the warehouseman." Id. 167.
1271d. 159 (quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
128 Indeed, all of the "municipal" functions of Chickasaw are sometimes performed by private entities. Assume that the land encompasspd by Chickasaw is
owned by two corporations-one a land development company on whose property
live all the people in the vicinity; the other a shopping complex (like Logan Valley)
on which are situated the only businesses in thd vicinity. Is either corporation

performing an exclusively public function?

Does the function become exclusively

public if the two enterprises fall into the same hands?

The situation in Marsh,

like that in Terry, can be characterized in termfs of either theoretical or practical
alternatives. Residents of Chickasaw were free to do their shopping in Mobile
and other municipalities, and could, if they had cared to,: have stepped outside of
the- property owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation to hear Mrs. Marsh's

religious messages.
129 553 F.2d at 772 &n.14.-
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The assertion that a century-old remedy is inconsistent with tradition
seems fairly persuasive evidence that this criterion is no more determinate than the concepts of "government. function" and "exclusivity" relied on by Justice Rehnquist. 13
Because it is not possible to describe the essence or scope of the
government function or the exclusivity with which it -is performed
with any degree of specificity,13 ' the public function doctrine invites manipulation. It does serve as a proxy for decisions on the
merits, but not in any defensible way. And in Flagg Brothers, the
Court used the finding of no state action to deny the plaintiffs'
pxocedural due process claims without addressing them on the
32

merits.1

The final approach to state action, which I term "formalist,"
would apply the fourteenth amendment only to state officials acting
directly against the complainant, and would deem "private" all
action by people other than officials. This strategy might reflect
the view that the Constitution should be concerned only with
abuses of power visibly engaged in by the government; it might
seem to offer a clarity or certainty of application noticeably missing
from the other approaches. As with other formalist legal strategies,.
however, the certainty is deceptive. For example, the formalist
would almost surely wish not to find state action where a state
official (such as a judge or sheriff) enforced "consensual" private
ordering; this exception itself requires creating a criterion of consent.13 3

Consider, also, how the formalist would respond to mis-

conduct by the police if the state contracted with "private" agencies
to perform all law-enforcement and peace-keeping functions. I
130 See supratext accompanying notes 122-28.
13 1 For further illustration of this point, compare Metropolitan Edison, described
supra note 122, with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in
which the Court held that the Federal Labor Standards Act could not constitutionally be applied to various state and municipal employees on the ground that
the federal provisions would
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-

employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These activities are
typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging
their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are
created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens.
Id. 851 (emphasis added).
132 See also Judge Friendly's comments on Metropolitan Edison, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1289, 1291 (1982).
133 Cf., e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (discussed

supra note 111).
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shall not multiply examples. The point is that any simple formalist
strategy would rapidly be qualified-probably along the lines suggested by the first three approaches.
In sum, the Court's state action doctrine seems a crude substitute for addressing and accommodating the concerns to prevent
abuse of power on the one hand, and to protect individual autonomy and federalist values on the other. The doctrine does
serve an important ideological function: it reflects and reinforces
the ideas of natural spheres of individual autonomy and a natural
regime of property rights. If this is inconsistent with a purely
positivist theory of the state, the answer is-pace Justice Rehnquist-that American constitutional jurisprudence has never adopted
any pure political theory, that it has comfortably embraced contradictory theories. Whatever its pragmatic virtues, however, this
Whitmanesque capacity to encompass contradictions invites manipulation and mystification. The state action doctrine seems a case on
point. The doctrine has seldom been used to shelter citizens from
coercive federal or judicial power. More often, it has been employed to protect the autonomy of business enterprises against the
claims of consumers, minorities, and other relatively powerless
citizens.

